ABSTRACT: In many languages, reflexively marked predicates with plural arguments can describe scenarios of reciprocal action (Evans
Introduction
In many languages, 'reflexively marked' verbs appear to have rather different truth conditions from 'reciprocally marked' verbs. For example, the English reflexive sentence in (1a) seems not to overlap in meaning with the English reciprocal sentence in (1b).
(1) English Reflexives and Reciprocals With Plural Antecedents a.
The boys slapped themselves. b.
The boys slapped each other.
To illustrate, sentence (1a) is most commonly understood to describe a scenario like that in (2a), while (1b) is understood to describe a scenario like that in (2b). 1 Moreover, (1a) cannot be understood as true or appropriate in scenario (2b), and (1b) can never serve as a true description of the scenario in (2a). While the English pattern above is found in a majority of the world's languages (61.4%; Heine & Miyashita 2008) , many languages show an extensive overlap between the 1 Of course, there are many other kinds of scenarios that reciprocal sentences like (1b) can describe, an issue that has received extensive attention in the semantic literature on reciprocals (Dalrymple et al. 1998 , Sternefeld 1998 , Beck 2001 , Kerem et al. 2009 ). For the purposes of this paper, I will put aside these issues, and for simplicity's sake I will focus on interpretations akin to that in (2b), interpretations often labeled 'weak reciprocity' (Dalrymple et al. 1998 ). As shown above, I will use the informal label 'reciprocal scenario' to refer to such scenarios of weak reciprocity, while the label 'reflexive scenario' is used to refer to scenarios of distributed (atomic) reflexive action.
use of reflexively and reciprocally marked verbs. This pattern, illustrated below, is especially prevalent within Europe (Heine & Miyashita 2008) , though it is by no means exclusive to that area (Murray 2007 (Murray , 2008 Can truthfully describe only (2b)
In each of the languages in (3)- (7), reflexively marked sentences like those in (a) can easily be understood as truthfully describing either the reflexive scenario in (2a) or the reciprocal scenario in (2b). 4 , Further examples of this pattern can be found in Evans 2008 , Heine & Miyashita 2008 , Maslova 2008 , Murray 2007 , Nedjalkov 2007 , amongst many others. Many such languages also possess uniquely reciprocal markers, illustrated in the (b) sentences above. When containing these markers, the resulting sentences can only truthfully describe the reciprocal scenario in (2b).
The ability for reflexively marked sentences like (3a)-(7a) to be true in either the reflexive scenario (2a) or the reciprocal scenario (2b) has sometimes been informally described as a case of 'ambiguity' or 'polysemy' (Heine & Miyashita 2008 , Gast & Haas 2008 , Maslova 2008 . 5 It should be noted, however, that for the languages studied here, it is more accurate to say that the reflexively marked (a)-sentences simply have an especially 3 Gast & Haas (2008) argue that the ability of (7a) to describe both (2a,b) rests on a lexical ambiguity in the element sich. They argue that there is both a pronoun sich and a clitic sich, and that only the latter can be used in descriptions of reciprocal scenarios like (2b). Moreover, they propose that clitic sich permits such use because it has a more general use as a 'middle marker', and reciprocal scenarios are frequently described via the use of middles.
The main argument for this view is the oft-observed fact that sich cannot be used to describe reciprocal scenarios when it is complement to PP. However, as Gast & Haas themselves note, there are other languages where such a lexical ambiguity analysis would be incorrect. Moreover, we should note that there are many languages where (a) reflexively marked predicates can describe reciprocal scenarios, but (b) reflexive markers are not generally used as 'middle' markers. As described by Fortescue (2007) , Kalaallisut is one such language.
(i) immi-ssin-nut tuqun-niar-pusi REFL-2PL-ALL kill-FUT-2PL.IND You are all going to kill yourselves / each other (Fortescue 2007 : 820) For this reason, I will in this paper put aside the view that the data in (3a)-(7a) are due to the reflexive being interpreted as a 'middle maker'. I will also put aside the view that these reflexive markers are ambiguous in any way. As we will see in Section 2, it is possible to have a rather simple, univocal analysis of these facts. 4 Note that in some of the sentences in (3)- (7), the verb appears in imperfective aspect, while in others the verb appears in perfective aspect. The choice of verbal aspect was left open to the speakers translating the English sentences in (1), given the contexts in (2). I will ignore these differences in aspect throughout this paper, as I do not believe that they are significant. 5 Although they can describe both the 'reflexive' and the 'reciprocal' scenarios in (2), I refer to the 'a'-sentences in (3)- (7) as 'reflexively marked'. This terminology, which is fairly standard for each language, reflects the fact that these sentences contain a morpheme that grammarians identify as a 'reflexive marker' in the language. weak meaning, relative to their English counterpart in (1a). To illustrate, consider the 'mixed' scenario in (8), the importance of which was first noted by Murray (2007 Murray ( , 2008 Importantly, neither of the English sentences in (1) are true or appropriate in a mixed scenario like (8). Thus, if the facts in (3a)-(7a) were due to an ambiguity or polysemy between the meaning expressed by the English (1a) and that expressed by (1b), we would expect that (3a)-(7a) would similarly fail to accurately describe the 'mixed' scenario in (8). This appears not to be the case. That is, speakers report that each of (3a), (4a), (5a), (6a), and (7a) can describe the mixed scenario in (8). Thus, we can conclude that these sentences are not ambiguous between a reading equivalent to (1a) and one equivalent to (1b). Rather, they possess a single, weak interpretation, one that encompasses all the scenarios in (2a), (2b) and (8).
6 This point will be returned to in Section 2, where we will see that -given current assumptions regarding the semantics of plurals -the truth-conditions predicted for sentences (3a)-(7a) are weak enough to hold in reflexive scenarios (2a), reciprocal scenarios (2b), and mixed scenarios (8). 7, 8 Interestingly, many languages exhibiting the pattern in (3)-(7) also possess a means for specifying a reflexive scenario like (2a). That is, along side the relatively weak sentences in (3a)-(7a), there are the sentences in (9)-(13), each of which is only true or appropriate in (2a). 9 Note that in each of the sentences below, the reflexive marker appears with a so-called 'intensifier', which is indicated in boldface.
(9)
Focused Reflexives in French Can truthfully describe only (2a), not (2b) or (8).
6 Murray (2007 Murray ( , 2008 uses precisely this argument to show that reflexive sentences in Cheyenne are not ambiguous between a 'reflexive' and a 'reciprocal' meaning, but rather have a weak semantics that covers both kinds of scenarios. I developed the scenario in (8) and the concomitant arguments independently. I thank an anonymous reviewer for Journal of Semantics for bringing Murray's important work to my attention.
7 McGregor (2000: 118) similarly argues that use of reflexives in Nyulnyulan languages to describe reciprocal scenarios is due to weakness (which she calls 'vagueness') rather than true ambiguity or polysemy: "…specific senses such as reflexive, reciprocal, chaining, etc. are contextual senses of the general meaning of the reflexive/reciprocals; the construction is not polysemous, and there is no ambiguity -merely vagueness…". 8 As mentioned in Footnote 6, Murray (2007 Murray ( , 2008 ) also develops a formal semantics for reflexives, whereby sentences like (3a)-(7a) receive weak readings that hold in scenarios (2a), (2b), and (8). Murray's analysis, however, is embedded within the special formalism of Dynamic Plural Logic (van den Berg 1996) , and so therefore differs substantially from the account presented here. 9 Note that this claim will be qualified in Section 3 below. There, we will see that there are ways of augmenting the context so that even the sentences in (9)-(13) can describe reciprocal and mixed scenarios. 10 The term 'intensifier' is equivalent to the oft-used labels 'emphatic reflexive' and 'intensive reflexive' (Heine & Miyashita 2008) . The fact that such intensifiers rule out a reciprocal construal of a reflexive sentence has long been noted throughout the descriptive and typological literature (Gast & Haas 2008 , Heine & Miyashita 2008 Can truthfully describe only (2a), not (2b) or (8).
Following much work on 'intensifiers' in reflexive constructions, I will assume that the appearance of the intensifiers in (9)-(13) serves to place contrastive focus upon the reflexive marker (Eckardt 2001; Gast & Haas 2008; Saebo 2009 , Wiemer & Nedjalkov 2007 ZribiHertz 1995 ZribiHertz , 2008 . 11 Although it remains a difficult open question exactly how these intensifiers contribute such contrastive focus (Eckardt 2001 , Saebo 2009 ), I will assume here a relatively simplified picture. I will assume that, despite their varying surface syntax, each of the sentences in (9)- (13) Gast & Haas (2008) claim that focal accent on the reflexive marker sich does not really require presence of the modifier selbst, as sentences like the following are (to them) acceptable.
(i) Die schüler schlagen SICH the students hit REFL The students are hitting themselves. Judgment:
Can truthfully describe only (2a), not (2b) or (8). However, as noted by Wiemer & Nedjalkov (2007) , most speakers of German tend not to like sentences like (i), preferring that a focused sich also appear with the intensifier selbst. Thus, I will put aside sentences like (i) in my discussion here.
Under this syntax, there is a single structural unit serving as a bound reflexive pronoun. Furthermore, via the appearance of the intensifier, this bound reflexive bears F(ocus)-marking. Finally, I assume the syntax and semantics for pronominal binding developed by Heim & Kratzer (1998) , whereby both the reflexive and the trace of the subject are bound by a higher index 1, which ultimately contributes a lambda operator.
The main goal of this paper is to develop a formal semantic analysis of the contrast between the sentences in (3a)-(7a) and those in (9)-(13). That is, we will primarily be concerned with (i) the relatively weak semantics of (3a)-(7a), and (ii) the effect that contrastive focus seems to have on the truth-conditions of the sentences in (9)-(13). I will not in this paper be concerned with the effect of the reciprocal markers in (3b)-(7b), though that is also an important part of the overall picture.
In the following section, I show that current approaches to the semantics of plural predication predict that reflexively marked predicates with plural arguments can receive especially weak truth-conditions, ones that hold in reflexive scenarios (2a), reciprocal scenarios (2b) and mixed scenarios (8). Thus, the facts in (3a)-(7a) are easily accounted for under current semantic assumptions, and those sentences can easily be provided a single, univocal analysis.
Having accounted for the facts in (3a)-(7a), I turn in Section 3 to the complementary facts in (9)-(13). There, I argue that some rather basic assumptions regarding the semantics of focus predict that F-marking of the reflexive anaphor in (3a)-(7a) will create a structure that (without a facilitating context) only truthfully describes reflexive scenarios like (2a). Importantly, the proposed analysis correctly predicts that certain key changes to the context in which (9)-(13) are uttered allows for those sentences to again describe the reciprocal scenario in (2b) and the mixed scenario in (8). Thus, under this analysis, the existence of focus in (9)-(13) doesn't truly preclude the weak interpretation of (3a)-(7a). Rather, it causes that interpretation to only be felicitous if certain discourse conditions are satisfied. In contexts where those conditions are not satisfied -such as null (out-of-the-blue) contextsfocus of the reflexive marker will force a stronger, distributive reading of (3a)-(7a), one that only holds in reflexive scenarios like (2a). These points will become clearer in Section 3, where the details of the analysis are put forth.
I conclude by offering some informed speculations regarding languages like English, where reflexive sentences seem (at first) only to ever be true in reflexive scenarios like (2a), and never in reciprocal (2b) or mixed scenarios (8). I show that, in all the languages examined, the same contextual manipulations that allow (9)-(13) to describe reciprocal and mixed scenarios also allow reflexive sentences in those languages to describe such scenarios. I therefore speculate that in these English-like languages, the reflexive markers inherently possess something akin to the focus-semantics of the F-marked reflexives in (9)-(13). I argue that some support for this can be found in the etymology of these languages' reflexive markers, which all seem to descend from 'intensifiers' like those in (9)-(13).
The Semantics of Reflexive Predicates with Plural Arguments
The ability of (3a)-(7a) to describe any of the scenarios in (2a), (2b), or (8) has sometimes been informally labeled a case of 'ambiguity' or 'polysemy' (Heine & Miyashita 2008 , Gast & Haas 2008 , Maslova 2008 . Importantly, however, current approaches to the semantics of plurals predict that reflexive predicates with plural arguments have especially weak truthconditions, ones that hold in reflexive, reciprocal and mixed scenarios (Sternefeld 1998 , Beck 2001 , Faller 2007 . 12 Thus, under these common semantic assumptions, it is the behavior of reflexive sentences in languages like English that is the unexpected puzzle, as reflexive sentences like (1a) are expected to be weaker than reciprocal ones like (1b).
To begin laying this out in detail, it's long been observed that sentences containing multiple plural arguments allow for readings with very weak truth conditions (Langendoen 1978 , Scha 1984 Jen Bill A key insight into the nature of these 'cumulative' readings was discovered through the work of Krifka (1992 Krifka ( , 1999 , who proposed that all natural language predicates exhibit the following key property. According to the principle in (16), for any natural language predicate P, if P holds between the entities x 1 ,…,x n , and holds between the entities y 1 ,…y n , then P holds for the plural sums (x 1 +y 1 ),…,(x n +y n ). Of course, as a limiting case, we derive that unary predicates such as boy in (17) are closed under plural sum formation. Thus, if the individual boys are Dave, Tom and Bill, then the predicate boy will be true of the individuals in (17ii).
(17) Illustration of (16): NP Denotations
Note that like many others who assume (16), I will mark metalanguage predicates with an asterisk '*' as a small notational mnemonic, to remind the reader that the predicates in question are all assumed to be cumulative. More interesting, however, is the case of verbal predicates, which are assumed to denote relations between entities and events (Krifka 1992 , Kratzer 2008 . As shown below, a verb such as hit will be assumed to denote the cumulative predicate in (18). Given the generalization in (16), then, it follows that in a scenario like (15b), the extension of hit will be equivalent to the set of triples in (18ii).
(18) Illustration of (16) 
(ii) Definition of the Operator 'σ x ' σ x . Q(x) = df the entity α such that α ∈ { x : Q(x) } and if γ ∈ { x : Q(x) }, then γ ≤ α
We also assume that the Davidsonian event argument of the verb is bound by a covert existential operator. The exact mechanisms of this are not important for our discussion; for our purposes, we assume that the silent operator in (20) is appended just above the subject.
(20) Phonologically Null Event Operator
Consequently, we assume that sentence (15a) has the LF structure in (21a) below, and therefore we derive that its truth conditions are as in (21b). (21 (15b), the existential truthconditions in (21b) are witnessed by the plural event e 1 +e 2 +e 3 , and so we correctly predict that (15a) is true in that scenario. In this way, the cumulativity principle in (16) allows us to easily derive weak, cumulative readings for sentences like (15a). With all this in mind, consider the truth conditions that are predicted for the reflexive sentence in (22a), assumed to have the LF in (22b) (Heim & Kratzer 1998 Given that the reflexive anaphor is bound by the plural subject, the truth conditions we obtain for LF (22b) are those in (23).
(23) Truth conditions Predicted for Reflexive LF (22b)
∃e .
[ λx e : λy e : λe ε : *hit(e) & *Agent(e) = y & *Theme(e) = x ](σ x .*boy(x))(σ x .*boy(x))(e)
Importantly, if the set of boys is {Tom, Dave, Bill, Frank}, it follows that σ x .*boy(x) = Tom+Dave+Bill+Frank, and so the truth conditions in (23) (24), the sum of all the agents is Tom+Dave+Bill+Frank, and the sum of all the themes is also Tom+Dave+Bill+Frank. Consequently, the cumulativity principle in (16) entails that, in each of these scenarios, the extension of hit contains the triple <Tom+Dave+Bill+Frank, Tom+Dave+Bill+Frank, e 1 +e 2 +e 3 +e 4 >. Therefore, we find that our semantics predicts the reflexive sentence in (22a) to be true in reflexive scenarios (24a), reciprocal scenarios (24b), and mixed scenarios (24c).
Of course, as noted earlier, this prediction does not actually hold of the English sentence in (22a). However, it does hold for the non-English sentences in (3a)-(7a). Let us, then, assume this analysis for those sentences. That is, I will assume that each of (3a)- (7a) have an LF akin to (22b), where a plural DP binds a simple reflexive pronoun (or clitic). As we have just seen, the cumulativity principle in (16) will correctly predict that (3a)-(7a) are true in each of the scenarios in (2a), (2b) and (8). Regarding the differing behavior of English reflexive sentences like (22a) and (1a), I will offer a few tentative proposals in Section 5.
We therefore find that rather basic (and commonly held) assumptions regarding the semantics of plural predication entail that reflexive sentences like (3a)-(7a) will receive very weak truth-conditions, ones that hold in reflexive scenarios like (2a), reciprocal scenarios like (2b) and mixed scenarios like (8). It is no mystery, then, that a significant minority of languages can use reflexive sentences to describe reciprocal and mixed scenarios. Moreover, we find that such breadth of use is not due to an ambiguity or polysemy in the reflexive marker/anaphor itself. Rather, in all cases the reflexive marker is assumed to simply be a reflexive anaphor, bound by a plural argument within the sentence. Given the cumulativity principle in (16), such an LF will receive a very weak -but univocal -interpretation, one that encompasses many scenario types beyond the purely reflexive one in (2a).
Although we needn't posit an ambiguity to account for the facts in (3a)-(7a), our semantics does predict a kind of 'hidden ambiguity' in these sentences. That is, it is commonly assumed that sentences like (22a) and (3a)-(7a) do possess a structural ambiguity: in addition to the LF in (22b), such sentences can be assigned the LF in (25), where the sister of the plural subject contains a 'distributivity' operator (Link 1983 , Schwarzschild 1996 , Winter 2000 13 A popular alternative to the 'DIST' operator in (25)- (26) is the cumulative '*'-operator, which can also serve to derive distributive readings (Beck 2000; Kratzer 2003 Kratzer , 2008 . In this paper, however, I will only make use of DIST operators like that in (26), simply because the key truth-conditional effect is somewhat more transparent.
If we assume the semantics for the DIST operator in (26) Note that the truth conditions in (27) will hold if and only if each individual boy z is such that there is an event e' of z hitting z. Thus, the distributive LF in (25) will only hold in a reflexive scenario like (24a), and not a reciprocal one like (24b) or a mixed one like (24c).
Since the distributive LF in (25) receives a stronger interpretation than the basic LF in (22b), it is difficult to detect the presence of this syntactic ambiguity. Furthermore, this ambiguity plays no role in our explanation of (3a)-(7a). However, the LF in (25) will play an important role in our analysis of sentences where the reflexive is marked by an intensifier, contributing contrastive focus.
The Effect of Intensifiers and Contrastive Focus upon Reflexive Sentences
In the preceding section, we saw that certain now-common semantic assumptions correctly predict that (3a)-(7a) will be true in reflexive, reciprocal and mixed scenarios. In the next two sections, we consider the contrasting behavior of the reflexive sentences containing so-called 'intensifiers' in (9)-(13). First, we will observe in this section that, contrary to first appearances, there are indeed contexts where such sentences can describe both reciprocal and mixed scenarios. With this fact in mind, we will introduce in Section 4 a few relatively simple background assumptions concerning the interpretation and licensing of focus in context. We will see that these assumptions correctly predict that in null ('out-of-the-blue') contexts, sentences like (9)-(13) will only be true in reflexive scenarios like (2a). We will then see that these assumptions also correctly predict the contexts where (9)-(13) can be read as true in reciprocal and mixed scenarios.
To begin, we saw in (9)-(13) that placement of contrastive focus on the reflexive marker in (3a)-(7a) appears to strengthen the meaning of the sentence, so that it is only true in reflexive scenarios like (2a). This basic pattern is further illustrated below. Consider first the three scenarios in (28). (28) As observed in Section 1, we find that the plain reflexive sentences in (29a)-(33a) can describe all three scenarios in (28). Importantly, however, the sentences in (29b)-(33b) are reported to only describe the reflexive washing scenario in (28a). Note that these latter sentences all contain 'intensifiers', and so given the assumptions summarized in (14), these are all sentences where the reflexive pronoun (clitic) bears F-marking. The judgments above cohere with the general pattern observed in Section 1 and widely reported in the literature on reflexive and reciprocal constructions (Gast & Haas 2008 , Heine & Miyashita 2008 , Wiemer 2007 . Interestingly, however, a rather minimal change to the linguistic context accompanying (28b) and (28c) has a dramatic effect upon the judgments of speakers. Consider the slight augmentation of (28b,c) below.
(34) 'Contrastive' Washing Scenarios a.
Reciprocal Washing: We work as assistants at a sleep-away camp for boys, along with some other assistants. I see that the boys we're in charge of all have really dirty backs (from rolling around in the dirt). I say to you "these boys need to get clean", and then I leave to do some errands. You tell the boys to go to the showers and clean up. Strikingly, speakers report that the focused reflexive sentences in (29b)-(33b) can be construed as true answers to the prompting questions in (34a) and (34b). Note that this is despite the fact that in (34a) each boy washes some other boy, rather than himself, while in (34b), about half the boys are washing some other boy. In other words, although the focused reflexive sentences in (29b)-(33b) are not felt to be true in the 'simple' contexts in (28b) and (28c), if those contexts are altered to the 'contrastive' ones in (34a,b), then speakers feel that those focused sentences can describe both reciprocal and mixed scenarios.
What is the crucial difference between the 'simple' contexts in (28) and the 'contrastive' ones in (34)? As my chosen labels suggest, the view I will pursue here is that in the contrastive scenarios (34), the context is one where there are other salient entities that can contrast with the antecedent of the reflexive anaphor. That is, in the spare, simple scenarios under (28), the only entities introduced into the discourse are the boys who are washing. However, in the more articulated contexts under (34), the discourse also explicitly incorporates the speaker, the addressee, and the other individuals who serve as 'assistants' at the camp.
This same effect of contrast can be seen the data below. You taught a class where the students were graded in a somewhat unorthodox fashion. Because it was an advanced class, the students were responsible for assigning the grades. Each student graded the work of some other student. You and I are now talking about your class, and I'm curious about how the grades in your class were assigned. I ask the following question: "How was the work in your class graded? Did you grade the work? Did the TAs grade it?..."
b.
Mixed Grading: Same as (41a), except that half the students each graded their own work, while the other half graded the work of some other student. You and I are now talking about your class, and I'm curious about how the grades in your class were assigned. I ask the following question: "How was the work in your class graded? Did you grade the work? Did the TAs grade it?..."
Just as we saw for (34), within these more articulated, contrastive contexts, speakers feel that the sentences in (36b)-(40b) would be truthful and appropriate answers to the prompting questions. Again, this is despite the fact that in (41a), each student grades some other student, rather than themselves, while in (41b), about half the students grade some other student. Taking these facts together, the following picture comes into view. First, in a simple context, a sentence containing an F-marked reflexive anaphor is felt to have stronger truthconditions than one without F-marking on the anaphor. In such contexts, these sentences are felt to only truthfully describe reflexive scenarios like (2a), and not reciprocal ones like (2b) or mixed ones like (8). I hypothesize that the key property of such simple contexts is that the only salient entities in the discourse are those constituting the plural antecedent of the reflexive anaphor. Consequently, if the context is one where there are other salient entities besides the referent of the plural antecedent, then reflexive sentences with F-marked anaphors are judged to have the weak truth-conditions of the non-focused sentences. In such contexts, even sentences containing F-marked anaphors are judged to be true in reciprocal and mixed scenarios. In the sections to follow, these will be the key generalizations I will seek to predict; I therefore summarize them below.
(42) The Key Generalizations
In a sentence S where (i) a reflexive anaphor is F-marked (i.e., modified by an intensifier), and (ii) the antecedent of the anaphor is a plural NP pl , then a.
If the discourse is such that { x : x ≤ [[NP pl ]] } are the only salient entities, then S is felt to only be true in a reflexive scenario.
b. If the discourse contains other salient entities besides { x : x ≤ [[NP pl ]] }, then
S is felt to be true in reflexive, reciprocal and mixed scenarios. That is, it is felt to have the exact same weak truth-conditions as the corresponding sentence without F-marking on the anaphor.
In the following section, I will begin to lay out an explanation for the generalizations in (42). Before we come to this, however, I would like to address a claim sometimes found in the descriptive and typological literature. In their study of reflexive markers in German, Gast 15 I have also found this effect at play in the interpretation of reflexive sentences translating "The boys shot themselves." Again, when only very basic, 'simple' contexts are presented, the sentences containing focused reflexives are judged not be to be true in reciprocal and mixed scenarios. However, in richer contexts, where the subject the boys can contrast with other discourse-salient entities, speakers report that even the focused reflexive sentences can describe the reciprocal and mixed scenarios. For reasons of space, however, I omit here this further supporting data. & Haas (2008) similarly note that German sentences with F-marked reflexive anaphors can sometimes describe reciprocal scenarios. However, they claim that what is crucial about such cases is that the predication can be understood as 'collective'. They posit that:
"… a reflexive with a plural subject is ambiguous between a distributive reflexive and a collective reflexive reading… In the first case, each of the individuals denoted by the plural subject acts on him-or herself and in the second case the individuals collectively act on themselves as a group. The latter reading is conceptually very similar to the reciprocal reading: if a,b,c act on themselves as a group, a indirectly acts on b and c, b indirectly acts on a and c, etc." (Gast & Haas 2008: 318) . Similar comments are made by Maslova (2008: 240-242) , who likewise claims that 'collectivity' is what allows reflexive sentences to be understood as true in reciprocal scenarios.
Since these authors do not assume a formal semantics, it is somewhat unclear what exactly they mean by 'collective readings' of reflexive sentences. Under one interpretation, their claims are exactly those that we made earlier in Section 2: sentences like (22a) are syntactically ambiguous between a simple, 'cumulative' LF in (22b) and an obligatorily distributive LF (25). Moreover, reflexive sentences with focused anaphors can receive 'reciprocal' interpretations precisely when the cumulative LF in (22b) is available to them. If we simply trade the term 'cumulative' for the term 'collective' in the works cited above, the resulting (informal) analysis comes very close to the (formal) one defended here.
We should note, however, that the possibility of a 'collective reading' in the technical sense preferred by semanticists is not what underlies the judgments regarding the contrastive scenarios in (34) and (41). That is, it does not seem plausible that the crucial difference between the simple contexts (28)/(35) and the contrastive contexts (34)/(41) is that only the latter model a 'collective reading' of the sentence. To expand upon this, let me first clarify what semanticists usually intend by the term 'collective reading'. First, as has long been observed, the sentence in (43a) below can describe any of the three scenarios in (43b). (43) Usually, semanticists use the term 'collective reading' to mean (roughly) an interpretation whereby the sentence describes a case of collective/joint action, like scenario (43biii). To be more precise, under a collective reading, the event e described by the sentence is one that does not contain any proper subevents e' that have as their agent some proper sub-part of the agent of e (see Kratzer 2003 Kratzer , 2008 . Note that this condition is satisfied in a scenario like (43biii), where there is a single event of 'carrying', with the plurality Dave+Tom as its agent.
With this in mind, consider again the contrast between the contexts in (28)/(35) and (34)/(41). Note that in each of these contexts, the character of the action described is held constant; the only real difference between (28)/(35) and (34)/(41) seems to be that the latter explicitly invokes entities besides those denoted by the plural subject. Thus, it's quite hard to see how a 'collective reading' (in the sense explained here) would be possible in (34)/(41) but not in (28)/(35). Furthermore, none of the scenarios in (28)-(41) seem to involve 'collection action' in the sense described above. In all the scenarios in (28)/(34), any event of washing e whose agent is the boys has a salient subevent of washing e' whose agent is some individual boy. Similarly, in all the scenarios in (35)/(41), any event of grading e whose agent is the students has a salient subevent of grading e' whose agent is some individual student. Consequently, given the meaning of 'collective reading' laid out above, none of the scenarios in (28)-(41) actually model a collective reading of the sentences in question.
Taking all of this together, we must conclude that the ability for sentences (29b)-(33b) to be understood as true in (contrastive) reciprocal scenarios (34a) or (contrastive) mixed scenarios (34b) cannot be due to their receiving a collective reading, at last in the sense preferred by semanticists. For this reason, I will put aside the view that a collective reading is required for (focused) reflexive sentences to describe reciprocal or mixed scenarios. 
A Formal Analysis of Contrastively Focused Reflexives
In the preceding section, I presented evidence for the 'key generalizations' in (42), which state that a sentence with an F-marked reflexive can describe a reciprocal or mixed scenario only if the context makes salient entities other than the antecedent of the reflexive. In this section, I will show that this generalization actually follows from some relatively basic assumptions regarding the semantics and licensing of F-marking in context. I begin by first laying out those core assumptions.
Key Assumptions Concerning the Semantics and Licensing of Focus
In this section, I will lay out the assumptions I make regarding the semantics of F-marking and its licensing in context. For my purposes here, I will adopt a somewhat simplified version of the well-known theory of Rooth (1985 Rooth ( , 1992 , combined with some key proposals developed by Sauerland (2000) . One central goal for a semantic theory of F-marking is to predict and explain the complex ways in which context affects its appearance. For example, in the context in (44), the accenting pattern in (44a) is licit, while that in (44b) A theory of contrasts such as these often contains two main ingredients: (i) a semantics for Fmarking, and (ii) a condition requiring that the semantic contribution of the F-marking in some sense 'fit' the prior discourse. 18 Regarding ingredient (i), I will adopt the well-known 16 Having said this, however, it should nevertheless also be noted that basic, non-distributive LFs like (21a) and (22b) will also be true in scenarios of collective action (Kratzer 2003 (Kratzer , 2008 . Thus, our analysis in Section 4 will predict that contexts where such LFs are interpretable will allow (in principle) for 'collective readings' of reflexive sentences. Again, however, our analysis does not (incorrectly) predict that such collective readings are a necessary condition for a reflexive sentence to be understood as true in a reciprocal or mixed scenario. 17 As is standard in the theoretical literature on focus, I use capitalization to indicate a focal accent, and an Fsubscript to indicate the scope of the F-marking. 18 Of course, not all theories of focus-licensing have this structure, Schwarzschild (1999) being one well-known example.
alternative semantics of Rooth (1985 Rooth ( , 1992 
If X is a head that does not bearing F-marking, then
If X is a phrase that does not bear F-marking, and if X is composed of the daughters Y and Z, then if
Thus, the focus-semantic value of an expression X depends upon whether X bears F-marking. If X does bear F-marking, then its focus semantic value is the set of all things within the semantic type of the normal-semantic value of X (45a). If X does not bear F-marking, then its focus-semantic value depends upon whether it is a head or a phrase. If X is a head, then its focus-semantic value is simply the singleton set of X's normal-semantic value (45b). If X is a phrase, then X's focus-semantic value is the 'point-wise semantic composition' of the focussemantic values of X's daughters (45c). Having put forth a semantics for F-marking, let us now consider the conditions that govern its appearance in context. For our purposes, I will follow Sauerland (2000) in simply assuming that the following necessary condition will be a consequence of any complete theory of focus licensing.
(46) Necessary Condition for the Licensing of Focus (Sauerland 2000)
Let g be any variable assignment. [ g,F and ¬ x ≤ Dave+Frank. Unfortunately, in the context under (44), the only salient entities are Dave and Frank. Consequently, there is no discourse salient x such that ¬ x ≤ Dave+Frank. Therefore, the condition in (46) cannot be satisfied by (44b) in the associated context, and so we correctly predict (44b) to be infelicitous.
We find, then, that the basic assumptions in (45)- (47) are able to predict contrasts such as those in (44). In the following subsection, we will see that these assumptions are also enough to predict the all the key generalizations in (42). Before we turn to this, however, I should make clear one final assumption that our account will rest upon. Throughout our discussion, I will assume that if a sentence S contains a definite plural DP, then (i) [[DP] ] is made salient in the discourse, as well as (ii) all the entities x such that x ≤ [[DP]]. Thus, when a sentence like The boys left is uttered, not only is σ x .*boy(x) made salient, but also all the individual boys.
The Effect of Contrastive Focus Upon Reflexive Sentences
We ended Section 3 with the empirical generalizations repeated in (48). In this section, we will see that preceding hypotheses regarding focus -particularly (46) and (47) -are able to predict both these generalizations. S is true in both reflexive, reciprocal and mixed scenarios. That is, it has the exact same weak truth-conditions as the corresponding sentence without focus on the anaphor.
We will begin by considering the generalization in (48a). This generalization covers data such as those repeated in (49) True only in simple reflexive washing (49ai), not in simple reciprocal washing (49aii), nor simple mixed washing (49aiii).
In the discussion to follow, I will focus specifically upon the German sentence in (49b). The reader is invited to confirm that the account developed here will extend to the parallel data from other languages in Section 3. To begin, recall my assumption that the key property of the 'simple' contexts in (49a) is that the only salient entities are the boys who are washing. That is, in each of these contexts, the only salient entities are { x : x is a boy or x = σ x .*boy(x) }. With this in mind, let us consider the readings our semantics predicts for sentence (49b) in such contexts. First, given our syntactic assumptions in (14) and (22), it follows that (49b) can in principle receive the LF below.
(50) 'Cumulative' LF for Sentence (49b)
Under this LF, the reflexive sich bears F-marking (contributed by the intensifier selbst), and is bound by a lambda operator adjacent to the plural antecedent die jüngen 'the boys'. For purposes of simplicity, I omit the auxiliary haben, as well as the intensifying particle itself.
Let us now consider whether the F-marking in (50) is licensed within a 'simple' context, where the only salient entities are { x : x is a boy or x = σ x .*boy(x) }. To begin, let us note that, in order to obtain an interpretation for (50) g(1/σx.*boy(x)) = σ x .*boy(x). Now recall that the only discourse salient entities in (49ai-iii) are { x : x is a boy or x = σ x .*boy(x) }. Clearly, then, there is no discourse salient z such that ¬ z ≤ σ x .*boy(x). Consequently, the licensing condition in (46) will not be satisfied
g(1/σx.*boy(x)) in any of the simple contexts in (49a). We find, then, that relative to the contexts in (49a), the F-marking in LF (50) is not licensed. Put informally, the problem is that the normal-semantic value of the F-marked anaphor in (50) is the denotation of its antecedent, 'the boys'. However, in simple contexts like those in (49a), there is no discourse salient entity that properly contrasts with 'the boys'; the only salient entities are the boys themselves. Thus, the contrastive licensing condition on F-marking (46) will not be satisfied by the F-marked reflexive, and so LF (50) does not receive a felicitous interpretation in any of the contexts in (49a). We must conclude, then, that any interpretation that is available to sentence (49b) in those 'simple' contexts is not derived from the 'cumulative' LF in (50).
Fortunately, however, (50) is not the only LF available to (49b). As noted in Section 2, sentences like (49b) can also receive a 'distributive' LF such as that in (52) 
Importantly, the F-marking in such distributive LFs does satisfy the contrastive licensing condition (46) in simple contexts like (49a). To see this, let us first note that to calculate an interpretation for (52), it must be that for every boy z,
g(1/z) has a defined interpretation. Again, the calculation below illustrates. [
Thus, as line (53e) g(1/z) = z. Now recall that the discourse salient entities in (49ai-iii) are { x : x is a boy or x = σ x .*boy(x) }. Since there are other boys besides z in (49ai-iii), it follows that there is another discourse salient entity z' such that ¬ z' ≤ z. Consequently, the licensing condition in (46) g(1/z) in any of the simple contexts in (49a).
We find, then, that the relative to the contexts in (49a), the F-marking in a distributive LF like (52) is indeed licensed. Given that this is the only possible LF for (49b) that is licensed in (49a), it follows that the truth conditions assigned to (52) represent the only reading that (49b) can receive under the 'simple' contexts in (49a). Finally, as the reader can confirm, the truth conditions that (52) receives are the ones in (54) below. Crucially, the truth conditions in (54) will only hold in reflexive scenarios (49ai), and not in either reciprocal (49aii) or mixed scenarios (49aiii). Given that these are the only truth conditions we derive for (49b) in 'simple' contexts, we find that our semantics successful captures the key generalization in (48a). Our overall explanation for generalization (48a) is difficult to summarize informally, but it could be put as follows. A sentence where a plural DP binds an F-marked anaphor can receive two possible LFs: (i) a distributive LF, where the sister of the DP contains a DISToperator, and (ii) a cumulative LF, where the sister of the DP contains no such DISToperator. In a context where the only salient entities are those that constitute the extension of the DP, the only interpretable LF is the distributive one. In the cumulative LF, the anaphor is coextensive with the plural DP. Thus, the contrastive focus on that anaphor requires that the plurality denoted by the DP contrast with some other (non-overlapping) entity. In a context where the only salient entities are parts of the DP's extension, there is no such contrasting entity, and so the cumulative LF does not receive a licit interpretation. On the other hand, in the distributive LF, the anaphor is (in a sense) interpreted as each of the individual members of the extension of the DP. Thus, the contrastive focus on the anaphor requires that the atomic subparts of the DP's extension contrast with some other salient entities. Of course, such contrasting entities could be the other subparts of the DP's extension, and so the distributive LF does receive a licit interpretation. Finally, since only the distributive LF receives a licit interpretation in such contexts, the sentences in question will only receive the truth-conditions of the distributive LF. Therefore, they can only be true in reflexive scenarios, ones where each atomic subpart of the plural DP bears the reflexive relation to itself.
Having accounted for the generalization in (48a), let us now consider that in (48b). This generalization covers data such as those repeated in (55) below. As before, I will focus upon the specific judgments in (55b). The reader is invited to confirm that the account developed here will extend to the other, parallel data from Section 3. True in both contrastive reciprocal washing (55ai) and in contrastive mixed washing (55aii).
To begin, recall my assumption that the key property of the 'contrastive' contexts in (55a) is that 'the boys' are not the only discourse salient entities. At the very least, the salient entities include { x : x is a boy or x = σ x .*boy(x) or x is a camp assistant }. Importantly, due to this minimal change in the context, we now predict that the F-marking in the cumulative LF below is properly licensed.
(56) 'Cumulative' LF for Sentence (49b)
Recall that, in order to determine whether the F-marking in (56) is licensed, we must check whether the licensing condition in (46) g(1/σx.*boy(x)) within the contexts in (55a). Note that, in these contexts, it is. As before, the definitions in (45) g(1/σx.*boy(x)) = σ x .*boy(x). Now, note again that in the contrastive contexts in (55a), the salient entities include { x : x is a camp assistant }. Consequently, there are discourse salient entities z such that ¬ z ≤ σ x .*boy(x), and so condition (46) g(1/σx.*boy(x)) in the contrastive contexts in (55a).
We therefore find that, relative to the contrastive contexts in (55a), the F-marking in the cumulative LF (56) will indeed be licensed. Furthermore, recall from Section 2 that such cumulative LFs will receive especially weak truth-conditions, ones that hold in reflexive, reciprocal and mixed scenarios. It follows, then, that we correctly predict sentence (55b) to be true in the contrastive reciprocal and contrastive mixed scenarios in (55a). In this way, our semantics successfully captures the key generalization in (48b).
Again, our explanation of (48b) is a bit difficult to summarize succinctly, but it is basically as follows. As before, a sentence where a plural DP binds an F-marked anaphor can receive two possible LFs: (i) a distributive LF, where the sister of the DP contains a DISToperator, and (ii) a cumulative LF, where the sister of the DP contains no such operator. In a context where the salient entities include ones that are not part of the extension of the DP, the cumulative LF becomes licensed. As before, in the cumulative LF, the anaphor is coextensive with the plural DP, and so the contrastive focus on that anaphor requires that the plurality denoted by the DP contrast with some other (non-overlapping) entity. Since such contrasting entities do exist in these contexts, there is no problem interpreting the cumulative LF. Finally, the truth conditions of the cumulative LF are such that they hold in both reciprocal and mixed scenarios. Consequently, we correctly predict that the sentences in question can be interpreted as true in these types of scenarios.
Taking these results together, we see that our semantics from Sections 2 and 4.1 indeed predicts the two key generalizations in (48), and thus the empirical patterns observed in Section 3. We find, then, that relatively basic and common assumptions concerning the semantics of plurals, reflexives, and (contrastive) focus can provide a rather clear formal explanation of the facts in (3)- (13), as well as the novel data paradigm presented in Section 3. In the following section, I offer some tentative thoughts regarding reflexives in languages like English, where reflexive sentences seem (at first blush) to never felicitously describe either reciprocal or mixed scenarios.
Languages Where Reflexive Sentences Only Ever Describe 'Reflexive' Scenarios
We saw in Section 2 that the pattern of judgments in (3a)- (7a) 20 Turkish also possesses a verbal affix -n-that can directly mark the verb as reflexive. However, this affix is not fully productive, and so I set it aside in the current study. 21 Russian also possesses a verbal affix -s' that can directly mark the verb as reflexive. However, this affix is not productive, and so I set it aside in the current study. Can describe the 'contrastive reciprocal grading' scenario (41a) and the 'contrastive mixed grading' scenario (41b).
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We find, then, that the reflexive markers of English, Turkish, Russian, Hindi and Hebrew exhibit the same behavior as the F-marked reflexives of French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian and German. Optimally, we should seek a unified explanation for all reflexive markers found to exhibit this pattern. Given the analysis developed in Section 4, it would seem that such an account must assume that the reflexive pronouns in (62)- (66) are subject to the same licensing condition as the F-marked reflexives in (9)-(13). However, an obvious difficulty for such an account is that none of the reflexive markers in (62)-(66) need bear prosodic focus. For example, the English sentences in (57) are most naturally read with a pitch accent on the verbs wash/grade, and with de-accenting of the reflexive anaphor themselves. Even under this intonation, however, the facts in (57) stand: these sentences cannot be used to describe the 'simple reciprocal/mixed' scenarios. Thus, even when they are de-accented, reflexive pronouns in English behave like the F-marked reflexives in (9)-(13). Whether this also holds for the other reflexive markers in (62)-(66) is difficult to say, but it is rather implausible to suppose that all these reflexives are obligatorily focused.
How, then, can we hope to extend the analysis of Section 4 to the cases in (62)-(66)? In considering this question, it is worth bearing in mind one key fact concerning the etymology of the reflexives in (62)-(66): each of those reflexives derives historically from what was originally an 'intensified' or F-marked reflexive like those in (9)-(13). In English, himself contains the morpheme self, which originally functioned as an 'intensifier', akin to the etymologically related selbst of German. The same holds for Turkish kindi-'self' and Hindi apne aap 'self's self'. Furthermore, in Russian, the pronoun sebja originally contrasted with a reduced reflexive clitic, one that has become grammaticalized in Russian as the (unproductive) verbal reflexive suffix -s'. A similar scenario seems to hold in Modern Hebrew regarding acm-'self'.
Thus, each of the anaphors in (62)- (66) was, at an earlier state of the language, an Fmarked reflexive pronoun. It would be natural to suppose, then, that at this earlier stage of the language, those reflexive pronouns exhibited exactly the behavior noted in Section 3 for the focused reflexives of (9)-(13). Over time, however, the unstressed, plain reflexives that these pronouns contrasted with disappeared, leaving these once specialized anaphors to become the general, productive means for signaling reflexivity. It is quite possible that, when the anaphors in (62)-(66) became grammaticalized as general reflexive markers, their characteristic contrastive meaning also became grammaticalized. That is, the contrasting alternatives that these pronouns regularly invoked via focus became reanalyzed as part of their basic lexical semantics. More concretely, we might suppose that the (plural) reflexives in (62)-(66) are each stipulated in the lexicon to be subject to the following licensing condition. g is only 'licensed' if there is a discourse salient entity x such that x is not a part of g(i).
As the reader can confirm, reasoning akin to that laid out in Section 4.2 will derive from (67) all the core facts regarding English themselves in (57) and (62). In this way, we might view the facts in (57)-(66) as a kind of historical relic, an inheritance from the time when these anaphors were all F-marked reflexives.
With this in mind, it is important to note that the reflexive markers in (3a)-(7a) did not historically arise from 'intensified' reflexive pronouns. The reflexive clitics in Romance languages originate from the Latin reflexive pronoun se, which was a general reflexive marker in the language. Similarly, German sich originates from Proto-Germanic si(c)h, also a general reflexive marker. Thus, the diachronic path sketched here for the reflexives in (62)- (66) would not hold for those in (3a)-(7a), and so they would not come to have the grammaticalized licensing condition in (67).
While this general approach would account for the core patterns in (57)- (66), it faces at least two serious problems. The first is simply that it seems to incorrectly predict that contrastive focus on reflexives in English-like languages should be vacuous. 27 The second serious problem concerns singular reflexives. Note that the condition in (67) must somehow be restricted to plural reflexives, as discourses like the following are perfectly acceptable in English. Dave saw himself.
Note that in the discourse above, there are no discourse salient entities other than Dave, the antecedent of himself. Consequently, the condition in (67) would be violated, were singular himself subject to it. For these reasons, the crude implementation in (67) cannot be considered a serious account of the facts in (57)-(66). However, if it is true that a contrast condition akin to that in (46) underlies the central facts from Section 3, then the parallel facts concerning the reflexives in (57)-(66) must also be tied to contrast in some sense. Given their historical roots in constrastive, 'intensified' reflexives, this is not implausible, though a complete answer must be left for future research.
Conclusion
The main focus of this paper has been the behavior of reflexive markers in languages such as French and German, particularly the differences between the simple reflexive sentences in (3a)-(7a) and the sentences containing so-called 'intensifiers' in (9)-(13).
First, we saw that the oft-noted ability of the simple reflexive sentences to describe reciprocal scenarios is not a case of lexical ambiguity or polysemy. Rather, as shown by their ability to describe mixed scenarios like (8), these sentences simply have especially weak truth-conditions. Moreover, we saw in Section 2 that now-standard views regarding the semantics of plurals straightforwardly predict that reflexive sentences should exhibit such weak truth-conditions. Thus, the facts in (3a)-(7a), (8) can receive a rather simple, univocal analysis.
Next, we turned our attention to sentences containing 'intensified' reflexives, such as those in (9)-(13). As widely noted, in 'simple' contexts, such sentences can only be understood as truthfully describing purely reflexive scenarios, and not reciprocal or mixed ones. However, we also saw that there are contexts where such sentences can truthfully describe reciprocal and mixed scenarios. The key property is one of contrast: reflexive sentences with intensifiers can describe reciprocal/mixed scenarios as long as there are contextually salient entities that don't overlap with the extension of the reflexive. We saw in Section 4 that one can give a rather explicit formal explanation for this generalization, one that makes relatively few special assumptions and largely rests upon very basic notions in the semantics of focus.
Finally, we examined languages like English, where reflexive sentences seem (at first glance) unable to describe reciprocal or mixed scenarios. We found that in many of those English-like languages, there are indeed contexts where reflexive sentences can describe reciprocal/mixed scenarios. Intriguingly those contexts are the same as those that allow 'intensified' reflexives to describe such scenarios. Consequently, I sought to extend the formal account developed in Section 4 to these English-like languages. The main complication in doing so is that even unstressed reflexives in these languages exhibit the properties of the F-marked reflexives in (9)-(13). I therefore propose that the alternatives invoked by the F-marked reflexives in (9)-(13) have become grammaticalized as part of the meaning of reflexives in English-like languages. While the etymology of the English-like reflexives supports this general view, very difficult questions remain regarding its formal implementation.
